

Exhibit 1, Part 6

services provided by Ganymede. The Agreements only define the “services” as “tax reclaim advisory services provided by [Ganymede] in the relevant Jurisdiction.”²⁷⁶

227. Based on my review of account statements and invoices, each Bellwether Plan paid Ganymede a percentage of its refund ranging from approximately 66% up to over 98%, as shown in **Table 2** below.²⁷⁷

Table 2 – Ganymede Payments

Plan	Tax Refund	Ganymede Payments	% of Refund
Bernina Pension Plan	\$ 10,358,759	\$ 6,875,498	66.4%
RJM Capital Pension Plan	\$ 10,621,413	\$ 7,107,621	66.9%
Delvian LLC Pension Plan	\$ 11,923,504	\$ 7,849,298	65.8%
Basalt Ventures LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	\$ 4,150,978	\$ 3,113,233	75.0%
STOR Capital Consulting LLC 401(k) Plan	\$ 3,957,606	\$ 2,968,205	75.0%
Edgepoint Capital LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	\$ 4,704,675	\$ 3,528,506	75.0%
Loggerhead Services LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	\$ 10,455,774	\$ 7,841,831	75.0%
Roadcraft Technologies LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	\$ 9,959,185	\$ 7,469,389	75.0%
The Bareroot Capital Investments LLC 401(k) Plan	\$ 4,380,378	\$ 3,285,283	75.0%
The Costello Advisors Pension Plan	\$ 4,015,602	\$ 3,889,380	96.9%
The LBR Capital Pension Plan	\$ 4,290,593	\$ 4,118,328	96.0%
The FWC Capital LLC Pension Plan	\$ 10,484,112	\$ 10,275,618	98.0%
The Proper Pacific LLC 401(k) Plan	\$ 4,318,902	\$ 4,150,142	96.1%
The Oaks Group Pension Plan	\$ 10,319,909	\$ 10,140,940	98.3%
The SVP 401(k) Plan	\$ 3,806,446	\$ 3,689,260	96.9%

228. As discussed below in paragraph 263, my analysis indicates that these percentages are consistent with amounts paid to Ganymede by the rest of the Plans.

B. Recruiters

229. While the Plans themselves received tiny shares of the refund amounts, certain individuals did receive enormous compensation for their role in recruiting others to establish pension plans (or to allow plans to be established in their name).

²⁷⁶ See, for example, Tax Reclaim Advisory Services Agreement between Ganymede and California Catalog Company Pension Plan (MPSKAT00022222). I have only seen written agreements with Ganymede for less than 15 of the Plans.

²⁷⁷ See Exhibit 4 for further detail.

1. Markowitz/van Merkensteijn/Klugman

230. As described in section V.A, beginning in summer 2014, entities controlled by Markowitz, van Merkensteijn, and Klugman entered into partnerships with 26 Plans with participants who were friends and family of Markowitz and van Merkensteijn.²⁷⁸ As with all Plans associated with Solo, the majority of the refund payments generated by these plans were retained by Shah's entities. Specifically, Klugman, Markowitz, and van Merkensteijn agreed with Shah that for the new Plans established in 2014, Ganymede would receive 75% of the gross refund paid by SKAT.²⁷⁹ After "fees" to Ganymede had been paid, it was Markowitz, van Merkensteijn, and Klugman who reaped the overwhelming majority of what remained of the tax refund payments.
231. Three of the Bellwether Plans (Roadcraft, Loggerhead, and Bareroot) entered into partnership agreements with RAK Investment Trust (Klugman's entity) and Routt Capital Trust (Markowitz's entity) through which those two entities received, respectively, 25% and 70% of the available proceeds net of Ganymede's fee.²⁸⁰ The Plans themselves were left with 5% of the remaining funds. For Roadcraft, that represented a total of \$121,967, or 1.2% of the total tax refund and 0.2% of the gross dividend; for Loggerhead, a total of \$120,514.21, or 1.2% of the total tax refund and 0.2% of the gross dividend; and for Bareroot, a total of \$47,336.98, or 1.1% of the total tax refund and 0.3% percent of the gross dividend.²⁸¹
232. The Kaye Scholer Plans that Markowitz's, van Merkensteijn's, and Klugman's entities entered into partnerships with generated over \$163 million in tax refund payments.²⁸² As a

²⁷⁸ Klugman himself did not recruit anyone to create Plans in 2014 through 2015 but received stakes in the partnerships consistent with finder's fees for having first introduced Markowitz and van Merkensteijn to Shah. See Deposition of Robert Klugman dated January 28, 2021, 78:5 – 79:5; 80:10 – 81:7. In fact, although Ronald Altbach, Joseph Herman, Robin Jones, Perry Lerner, and David Zelman entered into partnership arrangements with Klugman through which he received this enormous amount of money, each testified that they either did not even know Klugman or did not know that he entered into a partnership with their Plans. Deposition of Ronald Altbach dated October 30, 2020, 217:13-24; Deposition of Joseph Herman dated July 9, 2020, 122:17 – 124:9; Deposition of Robin Jones dated November 4, 2020, 79:14-21, 80:17-20, 81:5-22; Deposition of Perry Lerner dated September 16, 2020, 129:18 – 130:3; Deposition of David Zelman dated December 11, 2020, 115:8 – 116:1. Similarly, Klugman testified that he did not know Altbach, Herman, Jones, Lerner, or Zelman. See Deposition of Robert Klugman dated January 28, 2021, 30:3-16.

²⁷⁹ Klugman Tr. at 65:16-21.

²⁸⁰ As discussed *supra*.

²⁸¹ See Exhibit 4 for further detail.

²⁸² See Exhibit 1.

result of the partnership arrangements with those Plans, the entities controlled by Markowitz, van Merkensteijn, and Klugman stood to receive approximately \$15 million, \$13 million, and \$10 million, respectively, from those Plans' refund applications.²⁸³ My analysis of payments made from the Plans' bank accounts and their accounts at the Solo Custodians indicate that the Markowitz, van Merkensteijn, and Klugman entities received amounts consistent with their shares of the partnerships.

233. Markowitz and van Merkensteijn also profited from Plans even when their entities were not partnered with them. Based on my review of partnership agreements, if Markowitz's entity was partnering with a Plan, van Merkensteijn would typically be appointed Manager of the Plan, and vice versa.²⁸⁴ This entitled Markowitz and van Merkensteijn to payments of \$10,000 per year per plan for which each had the title of "Manager".
234. To demonstrate how these payment flows operated consistent with the agreements among Solo and the Recruiters, I detail below fund flows in and out of Roadcraft's accounts at the Solo Custodians.

2. Roadcraft Payment Flows

235. On July 3, 2015, Goal Taxback, after receiving payment from SKAT in connection with Roadcraft's application for withheld dividend tax on shares of Coloplast A/S-B, and after taking its fee, paid DKK 1,774,684.98 to the Roadcraft Plan's account at Solo Capital.²⁸⁵ Just prior to receiving this payment, the Roadcraft Plan's DKK cash account at Solo Capital had a zero balance. On July 20, 2015, the Plan paid Ganymede DKK 1,342,424.34, exactly 75% of the gross refund.²⁸⁶
236. On July 16, 2015, Goal Taxback made refund payments for 13 dividend reclaims to the Roadcraft Plan's account at Solo Capital, totaling DKK 64,705,492.56.²⁸⁷ On August 7, 2015, the Roadcraft Plan sent a total of DKK 48,784,434.09 to Ganymede from their Solo

²⁸³ Calculated by applying the relevant partnership percentages to the tax claim after taking into account the payment to Ganymede of 75%.

²⁸⁴ See, e.g., WH_MDL_00012567; MBJ_STOR-0002765.

²⁸⁵ See MPSKAT00008759 at -8784 (Roadcraft Solo 2015 Account Statement).

²⁸⁶ See MPSKAT00008759 at -8784 (Roadcraft Solo 2015 Account Statement); MPSKAT00010288 (Ganymede July 7, 2015 invoice to Roadcraft Plan).

²⁸⁷ See MPSKAT00008759 at -8784 (Roadcraft Solo 2015 Account Statement).

Capital account in relation to these 13 refund payments.²⁸⁸ This also amounts to 75% of the total gross refunds paid to the Roadcraft Plan for those 13 dividends.

237. In total, for the 14 refund applications made by the Roadcraft Plan in 2015 and one refund application in 2014, Goal Taxback paid out DKK 67,605,754.05 (approximately USD \$10 million) to Roadcraft for tax refunds.²⁸⁹
238. Over the course of its existence, the Roadcraft Plan received two payments from Solo Capital into its checking account at Wells Fargo: \$109,908.00 in August 2015²⁹⁰ and \$238,037.42 in November 2015.²⁹¹ These payments reflect two different methods by which the Recruiters received their cuts – for distributions made in summer 2015, Solo Capital paid the Recruiters their cut directly and the Plans’ smaller cut directly to the Plans, and for distributions made in November 2015, Solo Capital sent the aggregate of the Recruiters’ cut and the Plans’ cut in one payment to the Plans’ bank account. For the November 2015 distributions, the Plans were responsible for making the further payments to the Recruiters.
239. For example, in August 2015, Solo distributed funds to the Roadcraft Plan, the Routt Capital Trust, and the RAK Investment Trust directly from the Roadcraft Plan’s Solo Capital account to the U.S. bank accounts of the Roadcraft Plan, the Routt Capital Trust, and the RAK Investment Trust. The payment amounts matched the percentages due under the Roadcraft Partnership Agreement:²⁹² \$1,540,000 to the Routt Capital Trust (70% of the total Solo Capital distribution); \$550,000 to the RAK Investment Trust (25%); and \$109,908 to the Roadcraft Plan (5% of the distribution from Solo Capital).²⁹³
240. For the money transferred by Solo Capital in November 2015, the Roadcraft Plan made the partnership payments from its bank account at Wells Fargo. Of the \$238,037.42,

²⁸⁸ See MPSKAT00008759 at -8784 (Roadcraft Solo 2015 Account Statement); WH_MD_L_00050282 (Ganymede July 13, 2015 invoice to Roadcraft Plan).

²⁸⁹ Calculated using the exchange rates used in Roadcraft’s Old Park Lane and Solo Capital account statements (MPSKAT00007347 and MPSKAT00007012).

²⁹⁰ RC00000097.

²⁹¹ RC00000069. Notably, even when a Plan used another Shah-custodian besides Solo, transfers of funds to that Plan’s account would also come from Solo’s bank account. For instance, the Limelight Global Productions LLC Roth 401(k) Plan used Telesto as its custodian but received its payments from a Solo account. See LL00000063; LL00000078.

²⁹² WH_MD_L_00029401.

²⁹³ See MPSKAT00008759 at -8783 (Roadcraft Solo 2015 Account Statement); RC00000097.

Roadcraft paid the Routt Capital Trust \$167,050.00 (70.17%) and the RAK Investment Trust \$59,000 (24.78%).²⁹⁴

241. In total, the Roadcraft Plan retained only \$121,967 USD, or 1.2%, of the refunds paid by SKAT.²⁹⁵ The flow of funds is depicted below in Figure 36.²⁹⁶




Figure 36 – The Roadcraft Plan Tax Refunds

242. Payments from friends and family Plans were not the only means by which Markowitz, van Merkensteijn, and Klugman profited from their involvement in the scheme. Each of these defendants also established pension plans in which they themselves were the participants.²⁹⁷ And unlike the friends and family members they recruited, these individuals

²⁹⁴ RC00000100.

²⁹⁵ See Exhibit 4 for additional detail.

²⁹⁶ 121,967 is 5% of the total distributed to the Plan and the Partners: $121,967 = 5\% \times (\$121,967 + \$2,316,050)$. There was an additional deposit from Solo Capital of \$109,980 on August 28, 2015 plus a deposit of \$39,989.88 into Roadcraft's Solo Capital account from an unknown source. As a result, the difference in the amounts shown in Figure 36 and the tax refunds paid to the Roadcraft Plan is approximately \$150 thousand.

²⁹⁷ From August 2014 through mid-2015, Klugman had five Plans; Markowitz four; and van Merkensteijn four. See Exhibit 1.

retained a higher percentage of the refund payments paid by SKAT, specifically 25% of the refunds paid by SKAT, net of fees paid to the payment agents, the brokers, the custodians, and Ganymede.²⁹⁸

3. Lehman, Bradley, Tucci, and Crescenzo

243. The remaining Recruiters received compensation for bringing others into the scheme via payments from Solo-affiliated entities. In 2015, the flow of the payments was generally as follows: The Plans would pay Ganymede, which would in turn transfer funds to Elysium Global Limited (a BVI entity controlled by Shah).²⁹⁹ The funds would then be transferred to four offshore entities, which would then transfer the funds to U.S. shell entities controlled by Lehman, Bradley, Tucci, and Crescenzo. The entities established by these four individuals were all created in 2015, shortly before they began to receive transfers of millions of dollars for “consulting” or similar services purportedly provided to the four offshore entities.³⁰⁰ According to Bradley, Tucci, and Crescenzo, the only services provided by them or their entities was the introduction of friends and family to the scheme.³⁰¹

4. Roger Lehman

244. Roger Lehman received millions of dollars of payments from Ganymede or other Shah-controlled entities. Some of these were based on a percentage of the refunds paid by SKAT to various pension plans. Payments to Lehman were typically made to one of two entities owned and controlled by Lehman: Valerius LLC (“Valerius”) or First Alton, Inc. (“First Alton”).

²⁹⁸ Klugman Tr. at 65:16-21.

²⁹⁹ ELYSIUM-05315871 (Flowchart of Shah related entities).

³⁰⁰ See, e.g., ELYSIUM-04658774 (First Alton, Inc.); ELYSIUM-04665984 (First Alton, Inc.); ELYSIUM-04641823 (First Alton, Inc.); ELYSIUM-00008355 (First Alton, Inc.) ELYSIUM-07724581 (India Atlantic, Inc.); ELYSIUM-09346040 (Atlantic India, Inc.); ELYSIUM-09346042 (Pacific India, Inc.); Bradley Dep. Tr. 337:12-338:8; ELYSIUM-04720545 (Lava Beach, Inc.); ELYSIUM-04724945 (Sand Dollar Beach, Inc.); ELYSIUM-04725421 (Starfish Dunes, Inc.); ELYSIUM-09228920 (Icon Beach, Inc.); Tucci Dep. Tr. 157:2-15; ELYSIUM-07792269 (Sabba Group Inc.); ELYSIUM-07792261 (Comisana, Inc.); Crescenzo Dep. Tr. 181:8-182:9.

³⁰¹ Bradley Dep. Tr. 334:24-340:7; Tucci Dep. Tr. 155:24-168:19; Crescenzo Dep. Tr. 157:13-160:16, 175:13-177:19, 182:15-185:23. Lehman’s brother also received payments for recruiting three of his friends to be participants in the Plans. Like Tucci, Bradley, and Crescenzo, Lehman’s brother did not provide any services aside from sourcing Plan participants., Lehman Tr. at 413:23 – 416:5.

245. For Plans in which Lehman himself was the participant, Solo's records suggest that Lehman was paid 15% of the refunds paid by SKAT.³⁰² In 2015, for his role in the scheme, Lehman's entities invoiced \$33 million from Ganymede or other Shah-controlled entities.³⁰³ No money from the refunds was paid to Lehman's Plans.³⁰⁴
246. Lehman and his brother together recruited three of Lehman's brother's friends to act as participants in a total of 15 Plans. Kevin Lehman was paid by Solo-related entities for these introductions.³⁰⁵ Kevin Lehman's entity SSM United LLC invoiced Solo-related entities approximately \$9 million.³⁰⁶ Solo's records show that it paid Kevin Lehman's entity SSM United LLC at least \$7,000,000.³⁰⁷ Lehman also received payments for his role in setting up and acting as an "authorized trader" for yet more Plans.³⁰⁸

5. Matthew Tucci

247. Matthew Tucci established six plans for which he was the principal and recruited others to establish 21 plans.³⁰⁹ He understood that he would receive between \$100,000 to \$300,000 for each plan introduced by him and told his recruits that they would make between \$35,000 to \$100,000 for each plan they established.³¹⁰
248. Tucci received a first payment of between approximately \$70,000 and \$150,000 in 2014, and a second payment of between \$4 and \$6 million, approximately a year later.³¹¹ None of these funds were paid to Tucci's Plans or the Plans' associated LLCs; the money was

³⁰² Roger Lehman invoiced Shah related entities for approximately \$33 million (see Lehman Exhibit 4024, 4025, 4027 and 4029) and the tax claims paid on the Plans for which he was listed as the beneficiary was approximately \$220 million (see ELYSIUM-07846030). \$33 million divided by \$220 million is 15 percent. *Also, compare, e.g.,* ELYSIUM-07426784 (Ganymede payment calculation spreadsheet) *with* ELYSIUM-03847468 (February 24, 2014 First Alton invoice to Ganymede).

³⁰³ See Lehman Exhibit 4024, 4025, 4027 and 4029; Lehman Dep. Tr. at 464:23 – 472:16.

³⁰⁴ Lehman Dep. Tr. at 453:24 – 454:10.

³⁰⁵ Lehman Dep. Tr. at 416:1-6.

³⁰⁶ ELYSIUM-00000542; ELYSIUM-00008335; ELYSIUM-00008359; ELYSIUM-00008475; ELYSIUM-07777712.

³⁰⁷ See ELYSIUM-04689274.

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., Lehman Dep. Tr. at 338:3-12, 348:21 – 349:21, 457:2 – 458:3, 480:13 – 483:6.

³⁰⁹ Tucci Dep. Tr. 22:12-26:12, Exhibit 1289.

³¹⁰ Tucci Dep. Tr. 53:6-55:14; 121:16-122:8; 123:13-24; 119:3-9.

³¹¹ Tucci Dep. Tr. 153:2-17.

transferred to his personal account and shell entity accounts established in connection with the scheme.³¹²

249. Tucci paid the others he recruited with portions of this money he had received from Solo/Ganymede.³¹³ He and his wife decided how much each of the other participants received.³¹⁴ The resulting payments ranged in size from \$0 to \$300,000, indicating that their allocation decisions were not based on the amount of shares each Plan purportedly owned or the amount of dividends each Plan purportedly received.
250. Tucci later came to believe that he had been “shorted” between \$2 to \$2.6 million for his efforts to advance the scheme.³¹⁵ Tucci raised the issue with Sanjay Shah, who then provided the money through a forgivable loan, paid to Tucci’s entity White Sands Advisors, Inc.³¹⁶

6. Doston Bradley

251. Doston Bradley established six plans for which he was the sole participant and recruited his family members to establish 14 plans. Bradley received approximately \$5.8 million in payments for establishing the 20 Plans for himself and his family.³¹⁷ None of these funds were paid to Bradley’s Plans or associated LLCs.³¹⁸
252. Bradley admitted that these transfers did not represent profits from trading on behalf of the plans but were instead payments for introducing plans into the scheme.³¹⁹
253. Bradley testified that he involved his parents in the scheme to provide for their retirement, but later admitted that he did not provide any of the money he received to his family members (including his parents), meaning those Plans and participants did not receive one dollar of the refund payments they were established to generate.³²⁰

³¹² Tucci Dep. Tr. 185:2-17, 126:21-127:6.

³¹³ Tucci Dep. Tr. 125:20-127:16.

³¹⁴ Tucci Dep. Tr. 127:25-128:9.

³¹⁵ Tucci Dep. Tr. 170:11-171:20.

³¹⁶ Tucci Dep. Tr. 174:4-25; 240:1-14; ELYSIUM-09330629; JPM0000208.

³¹⁷ Bradley Dep. Tr. 276:19-277:10; 306:14-20; 307:14-309:4.

³¹⁸ Bradley Dep. Tr. 277:22-278:10; Tr. 307:3-9; 339:20-25.

³¹⁹ Bradley Dep. Tr. 309:5-13.

³²⁰ Bradley Dep. Tr. 353:23-354:10.

254. Bradley also received a \$2 million loan from Sanjay Shah, which he claimed was for legitimate business use by his company Blackrain Inc.³²¹ Bradley testified that as of his deposition on October 14, 2021, he has not repaid the loan.³²²

7. Gavin Crescenzo

255. Gavin Crescenzo established six plans for which he was the sole participant and recruited his family members to establish 12 plans (six by his brother, five by his mother, and one by his wife). Crescenzo received approximately \$1.8 to \$1.9 million from Solo/Ganymede for his role.³²³ None of these payments were made to Plans established by Crescenzo or his relatives.³²⁴

256. Despite their formation of 11 plans, Crescenzo did not share any of the proceeds he received with his mother or brother.³²⁵

C. Other Individuals and their Plans

257. The Plans themselves generally received a fraction of the refund amounts claimed on their behalf.

258. As described more fully below, I determined that—for the 15 Bellwether Plans—on average, approximately 9% of the amount of the tax refunds paid by SKAT actually ended up being retained by the Bellwether Plans (see Exhibit 4). However, as demonstrated below, the percentages were much higher than 9% for the Plans established for the Recruiters, and much lower than 9% for Plans established for others.

259. The Bellwether Plans can be separated into two groups, those where the plan participant was a Recruiter and therefore received a higher percentage of the tax claim (excluding the Lehman group where the Recruiters received fees by invoicing Shah related entities directly as discussed *supra*) and those where the plan participant was not a recruiter or was part of the Lehman group. The five Argre and Kaye Scholer Bellwether Plans which had a Recruiter

³²¹ Bradley Dep. Tr. 324:16-326:20; ELYSIUM-05510674; JPM00000370; JPM00000381.

³²² Bradley Dep. Tr. 326:21-327:19.

³²³ Crescenzo Dep. Tr. 93:20-94:10; 179:1-6.

³²⁴ Crescenzo Dep. Tr. 93:20-96:25; 98:5-99:121; 151:15-152:2; 156:1-23; 157:13-25; 159:20-160:5; 176:23-178:1.

³²⁵ Crescenzo Dep. Tr. 192:12-193:3.

(van Merkensteijn, Markowitz, or Klugman) as the plan participant received between 21 to 32 percent of the tax refunds, as shown in **Table 3** below.³²⁶

Table 3 – Payments to Recruiter Plans

Plan	Plan Participant	Purported Investments	Purported Dividends	Refunds Received	Ganymede Payments	Amount Paid to Plan	% of Refund
Bermina Pension Plan	John van Merkensteijn	\$ 1,878,998,228	\$ 38,365,775	\$ 10,358,759	\$ (6,875,498)	\$ 3,193,447	30.8%
RJM Capital Pension Plan	Richard Markowitz	\$ 1,970,247,159	\$ 39,910,271	\$ 10,621,413	\$ (7,107,621)	\$ 3,387,433	31.9%
Basalt Ventures LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	John van Merkensteijn	\$ 672,112,226	\$ 15,373,992	\$ 4,150,978	\$ (3,113,233)	\$ 886,880	21.4%
STOR Capital Consulting LLC 401(k) Plan	Robert Klugman	\$ 646,576,763	\$ 14,657,801	\$ 3,957,606	\$ (2,968,205)	\$ 861,585	21.8%
Edgepoint Capital LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	Robert Klugman	\$ 802,387,731	\$ 17,092,435	\$ 4,704,675	\$ (3,528,506)	\$ 993,391	21.1%

260. Out of the remaining 10 Bellwether Plans, it appears that six of the Plans received no money from the refunds, and four received less than 2%, as shown in **Table 4** below.³²⁷

Table 4 – Payments to Non-Recruiter Plans

Plan	Plan Participant	Purported Investment	Purported Dividends	Refunds Received	Ganymede Payment	Amount Paid to Plan	% of Refund
Delvian LLC Pension Plan	Alicia Colodner	\$ 2,066,790,606	\$ 44,953,257	\$ 11,923,504	\$ (7,849,298)	\$ 194,203	1.6%
Loggerhead Services LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	Perry Lerner	\$ 1,074,275,449	\$ 38,725,090	\$ 10,455,774	\$ (7,841,831)	\$ 120,514	1.2%
Roadcraft Technologies LLC Roth 401(k) Plan	Ronald Altbach	\$ 1,041,022,669	\$ 36,885,870	\$ 9,959,185	\$ (7,469,389)	\$ 121,967	1.2%
The Bareroot Capital Investments LLC 401(k) Plan	David Zelman	\$ 694,869,341	\$ 16,223,622	\$ 4,380,378	\$ (3,285,283)	\$ 47,337	1.1%
The Costello Advisors Pension Plan	Gavin Crescenzo	\$ 660,099,881	\$ 14,872,599	\$ 4,015,602	\$ (3,889,380)	\$ -	0.0%
The LBR Capital Pension Plan	Doston Bradley	\$ 737,873,456	\$ 15,891,086	\$ 4,290,593	\$ (4,118,328)	\$ -	0.0%
The FWC Capital LLC Pension Plan	Roger Lehman	\$ 1,183,509,081	\$ 38,830,045	\$ 10,484,112	\$ (10,275,618)	\$ -	0.0%
The Proper Pacific LLC 401(k) Plan	Doston Bradley	\$ 783,034,148	\$ 15,995,932	\$ 4,318,902	\$ (4,150,142)	\$ -	0.0%
The Oaks Group Pension Plan	Matthew Tucci	\$ 1,139,614,285	\$ 38,221,886	\$ 10,319,909	\$ (10,140,940)	\$ -	0.0%
The SVP 401(k) Plan	Svetlin Petkov	\$ 610,996,178	\$ 14,097,947	\$ 3,806,446	\$ (3,689,260)	\$ -	0.0%

261. The distribution of proceeds illustrated above is not unique to the Bellwether Plans, rather these plans are illustrative of how each Plan under this scheme was set up: to siphon the majority of money to Shah-related entities (specifically Ganymede), with the next largest portion of money to the Recruiters (either through Partnership Payments, money funneled through Ganymede, or to their own Plans), leaving little, if any, money for the remaining Plans. To verify this, I performed a similar analysis on a sample of the remaining 2,289 claims³²⁸ using a sample size of 71.³²⁹ The sample size was determined by utilizing the following parameters:

- Population size of 2,289
- 95% level of confidence

³²⁶ See Exhibit 4 for additional detail.

³²⁷ See Exhibit 4 for additional detail.

³²⁸ 2,289 claims equal 2,559 total claims less 270 claims related to the Bellwether Plans.

³²⁹ Raosoft is a widely used and commonly accepted survey tool which can be accessed at www.raosoft.com.

- Response distribution of 95%

262. I then used a random number generator to generate the final selection of the 71 refund claims to analyze to avoid bias in the selection process.

263. The results of the sample (as shown below in **Table 5** and detailed further in Exhibit 5) confirmed that the payment structure for the Bellwether Plans is consistent throughout the Plans involved in the Solo Trades.

Table 5 – Payment Structure for the Plans

Group	# of Claims	Tax Refund Claims	Payment to Ganymede	Amount to Partners	Maximum Potential Amount Remaining for Plan	% of Tax Refund
Argre - Recruiter	5	\$ 5,926,548	\$ (3,934,292)	\$ -	\$ 1,992,256	33.6%
Arge - Non-Recruiter	12	\$ 2,690,909	\$ (1,786,715)	\$ (835,108)	\$ 69,086	2.6%
Kaye Scholer - Recruiter	6	\$ 888,773	\$ (666,580)	\$ -	\$ 222,193	25.0%
Kaye Scholer - Non-Recruiter	10	\$ 6,470,667	\$ (4,853,000)	\$ (1,536,783)	\$ 80,883	1.2%
Lehman	38	\$ 23,230,817	\$ (22,042,289)	\$ -	\$ 1,188,528	5.1%

264. Consistent with my findings for the Bellwether Plans, the Argre group of Plans for which the Plan participant was a Recruiter (i.e., Markowitz and van Merkensteijn, as well as non-defendants Stein and Lhote) all received at a maximum 34% (not accounting for additional purported trading and brokerage fees), while the remaining Argre Plans received less than 3% of the total tax refund. The Kaye Scholer group of claims for which the Plan participant was Richard Markowitz or Robert Klugman all received at a maximum 25% (not accounting for additional purported trading and brokerage fees), while the remaining Kaye Scholer Plans received less than 2% of the total tax refund. The Lehman group of Plans all received on average approximately 5% of the total tax refund (not accounting for additional purported trading and brokerage fees).

265. Consistent with my findings for the Bellwether Plans, the majority of the funds (approximately 66% to 95%) from the tax claims for the sample went to Ganymede. By extrapolating the findings of my sample (as detailed in **Exhibit 5**) to all of the claims, it is estimated that Ganymede received approximately \$946 million of the tax claims filed by the Plans, as shown below in **Table 6**.

Table 6 – Payments to Ganymede³³⁰

Group	Claim Amount (USD)	Ganymede %	Estimated Amount to Ganymede
Arge	\$ 288,335,443	66.4%	\$ 191,421,785
Kaye Scholer	\$ 242,949,205	75.0%	\$ 182,211,904
Lehman	\$ 603,205,921	94.9%	\$ 572,344,888
Total	\$ 1,134,490,569		\$ 945,978,576

VIII. Conclusion

266. I have concluded that:

- There is no evidence that the Plans ever owned actual shares of Danish companies resulting from the purported Solo Trades, or received actual dividends issued by the Danish companies whose shares were allegedly purchased by the Plans.
- The Solo Trades were pre-arranged, closed loop, circular transactions in which a short-seller purported to sell Danish shares to the Plans, but only obtained the non-existent shares by purportedly borrowing those same shares, either directly or indirectly, from the Plans that also did not have any shares. In effect, in all of the 2,559 Solo Trades, a seller “sold” shares it did not have to a Plan and purported to cover that “sale” by supposedly borrowing those same shares from the Plan, which never had the shares to begin with.
- The Plans did not have sufficient capital, liquidity, or creditworthiness to execute purchases of actual shares in the amounts and volumes of the Solo Trades.
- Based on my review of Solo Custodian account statements and Plan bank records, the overwhelming majority of the “profits” received by the Plans were derived from receiving a small fraction of the dividend tax refund claim paid by SKAT, with *de minimis* (if any) profits from anything but the refunds. Most of the proceeds from the tax reclaim payments went to Solo Capital or affiliated entities

³³⁰ Table 6 does not include the Zeta group of plans which had approximately \$4.3 million of claims. The tax claims are converted into USD using an exchange rate from S&P Capital IQ. The Ganymede percentage applied is estimated based on the average percentage to Ganymede calculated for each Group in the sample, as seen in Exhibit 5.

or the Recruiters.

267. This Report is based upon the information available to me and reviewed to date. I reserve the right to supplement or amend this Report as necessary to respond to any additional information that becomes available for my review including, but not limited to, issues raised by experts that may be retained by the defendants in this matter.



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December 31, 2021